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RECUSAL OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND THE
"SUPERVISORY POWER" DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
With the words "we order corrective measures sua sponte,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Reserve Min-
ing Co. v. Lord, I recently removed United States District Court Judge
Miles Lord from all further proceedings as trial judge in the Reserve
Mining litigation.3 Recusall occurred after almost four years of litiga-
tion5 concerning alleged pollution of the air and water by Reserve in the
area surrounding its taconite mining operations in northern Minnesota.6
Notwithstanding the advanced stage of the litigation, the Eighth Cir-
cuit, convinced that Reserve could not receive a fair adjudication of the
issues remaining to be decided by the district court,7 ordered the case
remanded to the chief judge of the Minnesota federal district court for
further assignment to another district judge.'
1. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188 (8th Cir. 1976). Sua sponte is defined
as: "Of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1592 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976).
3. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
4. "Recusation. In the civil law. A species of exception or plea to the jurisdiction, to
the effect that the particular judge is disqualified from hearing the cause by reason of
interest or prejudice." BLACK's LAW DICrMoNARY 1442 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
5. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). The original
litigation commenced on February 2, 1972. Id. For a detailed history of the litigation, see
id. at 500-06.
6. Reserve Mining Company is a Minnesota corporation operated solely for the benefit
of its parent corporations, Armco Steel Corporation and Republic Steel Corporation. See
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 22 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.). Its
mining operation consists of producing merchantable iron ore pellets from taconite, a
hard, grey rock which contains fine particles of magnetite, a black magnetic oxide of iron.
In Babbitt, Minnesota, the taconite is mined, processed, loaded into railroad cars, and
shipped some 47 miles on Reserve's intraplant railroad to Silver Bay, Minnesota for
further processing. See id. at 30.
7. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188-89 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976). A partial
list of the remaining issues included: (1) supervision of conflicts regarding abatement of
air and water pollution; (2) consideration of any new medical or scientific studies which
could precipitate reevaluation of the health hazard attributable to the discharges and
possibly affect existing time requirements for abatement; (3) assessment of fines and
penalties; (4) any applications by the United States for additional relief resulting from
failure of the State of Minnesota and Reserve to move with deliberate speed to terminate
discharging pollutants into the water and the air; and, (5) damages occasioned by the cost
of interim abatement. Id. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 538-40 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188-89 (8th Cir, 1976). The Eighth
Circuit then requested that the chief judge either assign a new judge or hear the remaining
1
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Litigation commenced when the United States filed a complaint in
federal district court alleging that Reserve's discharges of taconite tail-
ings' into Lake Superior violated several federal statutes and the federal
common law of nuisance." The case was set for trial before Judge Miles
Lord. Subsequently, the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan,
as well as various environmental groups, intervened as plaintiffs." Ap-
issues himself. Id. This was a request rather than mandatory order because assignment
of those cases in district court is a power granted to the chief judge of the particular
district. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 137, 2106 (1970). See generally Note, The Assignment of Cases
to Federal District Court Judges, 27 STAN. L. REv, 475 (1975).
9. Taconite tailings are the waste product resulting from the separation of those iron
ore particles rich in iron oxide from those that are lean or barren. See United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 30 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.). Eventually, these
tailings, combined with water into a slurry of approximately 2.7% solids, are deposited
on the shore of Lake Superior. Over a period of time a beach composed of the more coarse
tailings has emerged. The finer tailings flow across this beach into the lake as a slurry of
approximately 1.5% solids. This slurry acts as a heavy density current and flows to the
bottom. See id. at 30-31. See generally note 6 supra.
10. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). Violations of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-426i (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and the
federal common law of public nuisance were alleged in the original complaint. See United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 23-25 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.).
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 protects navigable waters along with harbor and
river improvements. More specifically, Section 407, known as the Refuse Act, forbids the
discharge, either from a floating craft or from the shore, of any refuse matter of any kind
or description into any navigable water of the United States unless a permit is granted
by the Secretary of the Army. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1342 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is aimed at enhancing the quality and value
of water resources and establishing a national policy for the prevention, control, and
abatement of water pollution. See 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
The basis for the federal common law of public nuisance claim was Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), In that case the Court stated that "[wlhen we deal with
air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law." See
id. at 103. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that there was no
general federal common law. But, where the rights alleged to be infringed arise under a
federal statute, the Erie doctrine does not apply. See generally Note, Exceptions to Erie
v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946); Note,
Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325
(1964).
11. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 499 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 21-23 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.). The environmen-
tal groups included: Minnesota Environmental Law Institute; Northern Environmental
Council; Save Lake Superior Association; Michigan Student Environmental Confedera-
tion; and Environmental Defense Fund. The Sierra Club filed an amicus brief in support
of plaintiffs' position. In addition, a number of parties intervened as defendants: North-
eastern Minnesota Development Association; Duluth Area Chamber of Commerce; and
the Towns of Silver Bay, Babbitt, and Beaver Bay, as well as several other civic and
governmental units in the immediate geographical vicinity of the Reserve processing
plant. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 499 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 22-23 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.).
[Vol. 3
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proximately one year after commencement of the action, the focus of
concern shifted from the abatement of water pollution to the public
health impact of continued discharges by Reserve into both the air and
the lake. 2 Eventually, the federal trial court, in United States v. Re-
serve Mining Co., 3 concluded that these discharges substantially en-
dangered the health of the people who lived in the communities sur-
rounding the processing facility or who obtained their drinking water
from the western arm of Lake Superior."
Based upon this finding and "the defendant's intransigence, even in
the light of the public health problem,"'" Judge Lord issued an injunc-
tion ordering Reserve to cease immediately its discharge of waste prod-
ucts into both Lake Superior and the air surrounding its processing
plant." Reserve appealed and the Eighth Circuit modified the injunc-
tion to permit Reserve a reasonable time to comply with the order to
discontinue the discharge." The appellate court then remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its order and provided specific
instructions to the district court. 8 Among these was a statement urging
the State of Minnesota and Reserve to "exercise zeal" in choosing an
on-land disposal site" and an admonition to the district court that its
jurisdiction did not include having a voice in the selection of the site.2"
12. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs argued
that the processing of the taconite ore resulted in the discharge into the air and water of
mineral fibers that were identical to amosite asbestos, a known carcinogen, and that
inhalation or ingestion of the asbestos particles was known to increase the incidence of
various forms of cancer. See id.
13. 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974) (Lord, J.).
14. See id. at 16.
15. See id. at 21.
16. See id. The obvious consequence of this injunction was to force an immediate
suspension of operations and shutdown of the plant. The injunction was in two parts. The
first enjoined Reserve from all further discharges into Lake Superior. This was a perma-
nent prohibition. The second prohibited all further discharges into the air until such time
as the court was satisfied that Reserve had complied with all Minnesota regulations
concerning such discharges. See id. The discharges into the air were found in violation of
several Minnesota air pollution control regulations. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492, 520-27 (8th Cir. 1975).
17. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537-38 (8th Cir. 1975). Although the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that Reserve's discharges into the air and
water did pose a public health danger and, therefore, justified a judicial remedy that was
preventive in nature, it did not concur that the danger was either imminent or certain.
The appellate court termed the public health threat as "potential" and, therefore, consid-
ered the action of the district court in closing the plant as an abuse of its discretion. See
id. at 535, 537.
18. See id. at 537-40.
19. Id. at 540. This "on-land" disposal site was to replace Lake Superior as the deposi-
tory of the taconite tailings. The court hoped that a final decision on the on-land site,
agreeable to both the State of Minnesota and Reserve, would be reached within one year
after a final appellate decision in the case. If no agreement could be reached, Reserve was
19771
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On March 16, 1975, the day following the announcement of this opinion,
Judge Lord summoned counsel for the parties to a hearing in his cham-
bers to discuss the appellate court opinion.' He indicated that he con-
sidered the admonition regarding the limits of district court jurisdiction
to be dicta and that he would not be bound by it.22 In response to Judge
Lord's remarks, the court of appeals issued a supplemental order indi-
cating:
Neither the district court nor any party is free to ignore our determina-
tions, including the determination that "[tihe resolution of the con-
troversy over an on-land disposal site does not fall within the jurdiction
of the federal courts" (citation omitted). We think it inappropriate to
characterize such a determination as "advisory" or dictum."
The court of appeals later determined that Judge Lord interfered with
the state on-land disposal site proceedings.2 4 Included in that interfer-
ence was the November 14, 1975 hearing initiated by Judge Lord to
"develop new health evidence. '25 As a result of this hearing, and hear-
to be given a "reasonable period of time" to phase out its operation at Silver Bay. See id.
at 538.
20. See id. at 539. The court emphasized that Minnesota law governed the issuance of
permits relative to the air and water discharges. Thus, only the State of Minnesota, guided
by principles of due process of law, could grant or deny Reserve permits to discharge
substances into its air and water. See id. at 539-40 & n.88. See generally MINN. STAT. chs.
115-116 (1976).
21. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d .181, 186 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. See id. For a list of the issues over which the district court had retained jurisdiction,
see note 7 supra.
23. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 541 (8th Cir. 1975). After the appellate
court judges read a newspaper article concerning the hearing held by Judge Lord, the court
sought and received a transcript of the district court hearing. The supplemental order
followed examination of the hearing transcript. See id. at 540-41. Issuance of this order,
the court indicated, was required to "propct the integrity of the processes of this court."
See id. at 540. The court directed the order be incorporated into and made a part of the
judgment on remand. See id. at 542.
Authority to issue a supplemental order derives both from the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure and case law. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948)
(power to act upon mandate survives to protect integrity of the court's own process); S.S.
Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 102 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir.) (court of appeals has
power to construe its mandate when necessary, exercise of that power being purely discre-
tionary), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939); FED. R. App. P. 40, 41. The Eighth Circuit had
issued no more than an opinion on the case at the time that Judge Lord made his remark
referring to the court's admonishment as dicta. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
No mandate would issue from the court until 21 days from the date of entry of a judgment.
See FED. R. App. P. 40(a). The appellate court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the case
during this time period, 14 days of which constitute the statutory period allowed for filing
a petition for rehearing. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 540-41 (8th Cir.
1975). The court's action, then, was in essence a clarification or further delineation of its
previously expressed intent.
24. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1976).
25. See id. Various Minnesota public officials, members of the Minnesota Pollution
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ings held earlier in November, and in response to a motion by the City
of Duluth ordering Reserve to bear the cost of water filtration for the
city, Judge Lord had ordered Reserve Mining, on November 15, 1975,
to deposit a check for $100,000 with the city treasurer." The motion had
been prompted by Judge Lord's suggestion that the city so move the
court and by his statement that he would order the city to bear the cost
if it took no action.Y
Interference, however, was not the sole reason for the recusal of Judge
Lord, although the court of appeals did indicate that removal was neces-
sary to protect the integrity of its previous mandate. s The appellate
court listed three separate factors as contributing to its decision: (1)
deliberate denial of due process; (2) gross bias exhibited against the
defendant Reserve Mining Company; and (3) intentional violation of a
mandate of the court.29 Based upon these transgressions, the court or-
dered the case remanded to the jurisdiction of the chief judge of the
district court of Minnesota with instructions that he either assign a new
judge or appoint himself to hear the remaining issues.3 Acknowledging
that Reserve's oral motion for recusal was an inadequate basis upon
which to support its action, the appellate court found authority for the
action in what it termed its "supervisory power" over the litigation at
hand. "
Control Agency, and the administrative judge appointed to oversee selection of the on-
land disposal site attended the hearing. They had been summoned by a letter, issued by
the district court and served by United States marshals, which informed them of the
meeting and requested their presence. See id.
26. See id. at 184-85.
27. See id. at 184 & n.3.
28. See id. at 188. While perhaps not the sole reason for removal, the impact of the
November hearings on the ultimate decision to remove Judge Lord cannot be denied. In
fact, immediately after the district court issued the order to deposit the $100,000 check,
Reserve, alleging lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard, filed a notice of appeal.
Additionally, Reserve filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to enjoin Judge Lord
from further interference with the state proceedings. See id. at 185. At a hearing on that
petition, the appellate court removed Judge Lord even though the petition did not seek
removal specifically. See id. at 188.
29. Id.
30. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
31. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188 (8th Cir. 1976). Initially, Reserve
sought only to enjoin Judge Lord from further interference, not to recuse him. See note
28 supra. Recusal was not broached until oral argument on the petition for the writ of
mandamus was presented. Rather than attempting to support removal either on the
petition for the writ or the oral motion to recuse, the court, invoking its "supervisory
power" over the litigation, recalled its earlier mandate issued in Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified its judgment, and directed remand to the
jurisdiction of the chief judge of the district of Minnesota. The court, having reopened its
previous mandate, then denied the petition for mandamus and ordered a return of the
$100,000 deposit to Reserve. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188-89 & n.8
19771
5
et al.: Recusal of Federal District Court Judges and the "Supervisory Pow
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The removal of a judge from litigation over which he has presided for
four years is unusual and inevitably leads to controversy. This Note,
however, will examine more than the Reserve decision. The considera-
tion is not the effect of removal of this particular judge from this partic-
ular case, but rather the consequences that the decision may have upon
future litigation. An analysis of the foundation upon which the court of
appeals rested its decision will demonstrate that the potential impact
on future litigation is critical. This Note, therefore, will explore (1) the
doctrine of "supervisory power," (2) the exercise of that power to remove
a federal district court judge from a particular case, and (3) the exercise
of that power sua sponte.
II. SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court derives its existence exclusively from the Consti-
tution.32 The exercise of its constitutionally granted powers cannot be
diminished by either the legislative or executive branches.3 The courts
of appeals and the district courts, on the other hand, derive their
(8th Cir. 1976). See generally Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir.
1973) (power to recall mandate inherent but reserved for special circumstances and to be
sparingly exercised); Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248,
254 (9th Cir. 1973) (recall power may be exercised sua sponte for good cause to avoid
injustice).
32. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33, 7 Cranch 31, 32 (1812) (Supreme Court
only "possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution"). See generally
U.S. CONST. art. III, § § 1, 2. Article III of the Constitution created the Supreme Court of
the United States. The language is self-executing: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court." Id. § 1 (emphasis added). Thus the Con-
gress cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction. See note 33 infra. By
way of contrast, Article III did not create the inferior courts and vests no jurisdiction in
them. Instead, the Constitution granted to Congress the power to "ordain and establish"
such courts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. See generally 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.1,
0.2[1], 0.7[2] (2d ed. 1948).
33. See Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904) (quoting United States v. Hudson,
11 U.S. 32, 33, 7 Cranch 21, 22 (1812)). Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution sets
forth the extent of the federal judicial power and divides the authority of the Supreme
Court between cases over which it has original jurisdiction and those over which it shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. While Congress cannot deny
the Court the authority to exercise jurisdiction in any matter over which the Constitution
grants the same, the "Exceptions" language of Article III may affect the scope of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the Congress does not control the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. And, although congressional authority to affect the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is viewed traditionally as plenary, of late it has been
suggested that Congress lacks the power to make exceptions that would destroy the Su-
preme Court's essential constitutional role. See 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3525 (1975). The framers, intending to fix firmly the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, empowered Congress to make exceptions only to the review of facts
and not to the jurisdictional grant. See Brandt, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional
Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 ORE. L. Rsv. 3 (1973).
[Vol. 3
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existence as well as any and all jurisdiction that they possess from the
Congress."
An examination of the jurisdictional powers conferred upon the courts
of appeals by Congress shows that Congress has not expressly granted
to the courts of appeals any supervisory power or control over district
court litigation.35 The courts of appeals derive their jurisdictional power
from Title 28 of the United States Code. 6 Specifically, Section 1291
confers upon the courts of appeals jurisdiction over all appeals from final
decisions of district courts. 7 Section 1292 expands upon this grant by
permitting jurisdiction to entertain appeals from certain types of inter-
locutory orders entered by district courts. 8 Congress has also provided
the courts of appeals with a statutory enforcement vehicle in the form
of the All Writs Act.39 This Act confers upon all federal courts the au-
thority to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions."4 0 But Congress has never expressly granted supervi-
sory powers over the district courts to the courts of appeals.
That an express grant of power may also include an implicit grant of
power inherent in the express grant is a well-established principle of
law.4 1 Therefore, because Congress has failed to grant expressly supervi-
34. See United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484, 488 (1867); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3526
(1975 & Supp. 1976); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); note 32 supra.
35. See notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text.
36. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, 1294 (1970). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE H9 3901-3904 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The roots of the basic jurisdictional grant to courts of
appeals, found in Section 1291, extend back to the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Section 22 of that Act provided that appeals in civil
actions could be taken to the circuit courts only from final decrees and judgments. See
id. § 22. From that time forward, finality of judgment has been deemed crucial. See, e.g.,
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-79 (1955). The only exceptions
to this rule are those provided by Congress, currently embodied in Section 1292, which
allow appeal from certain interlocutory orders. See id. at 180; Wynn v. Reconstruction
Finance Corp., 212 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1954). Limitation of the court's jurisdiction to
review only final judgments and certain interlocutory orders serves two functions: it avoids
piecemeal litigation and eliminates what could later amount to a needless interlocutory
appeal. See, e.g., McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). Historically, the first provision permitting interlocu-
tory appeals became law in 1891 with the establishment of circuit courts of appeals as
intermediate appellate courts. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Section
7 of that Act permitted appeals from any interlocutory order in equity which granted or
continued an injunction. See id. § 7. See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HAiv. L. REv. 607 (1975).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
40. See id. at § 1651(a).
41. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 159 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
Chief Justice Marshall stated: "[Tihere is no phrase in the [Constitution] which, like
19771
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sory power to the courts of appeals, any support for the Reserve court's
contention that it has "supervisory power" over district court litigation
must be based on the implied powers doctrine. The question thus be-
comes whether a supervisory power over litigation can be implied from
the express powers conferred upon the courts of appeals.
Until recently, the courts of appeals which faced the question of
whether they have supervisory power over district courts had responded
in the negative. For example, in Lewis v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,42
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explicitly indicated that it had
no general powers of superintendence over district courts or cases before
those courts. In Lewis a federal district judge had issued an order which
removed a condemnation proceeding instituted by United Gas Pipe Line
in a state court in Louisiana to federal district court. Two days later the
same judge rescinded the first order. An appeal followed. In dismissing
the appeal, the appellate court stated that the effect of revoking the
order was to remand the case to state court and that as such it was not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise. 3 Even in the event that the revoca-
tion did not amount to remand, review was precluded because any order
short of remand would amount to an interlocutory order, not appealable
until final judgment had been entered." In either situation, the court
of appeals considered itself without jurisdiction to intercede.,5
the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires
that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described." See id. at 406, 4
Wheat. at 199. This same "implied powers" argument had been made previously by both
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in writing a series of essays that first appeared
anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 in support and defense of the
proposed Constitution. In writing on both the necessary and proper clause and the su-
premacy clause, Hamilton asked: "What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a
thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the means necessary
to its execution?" THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 245 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). In
like fashion Madison counseled:
Had the Constitution been silent on this head [the necessary and proper
clause], there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means
of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government, by
unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in
reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wher-
ever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for
doing it is included.
Id. No. 44, at 321-22 (J. Madison).
42. 194 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 974 (1952).
43. See id. at 1006. While the order revoking the order of removal did not expressly
remand the case, the court of appeals found that remand was implied. Therefore, the court
held it was without jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) provides that "[ain
order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise." See 194 F.2d at 1006.
44. See 194 F.2d at 1006. The court looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) as limiting its
jurisdiction to appeals from final judgments. See 194 F.2d at 1006.
45. See 194 F.2d at 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 974 (1952). This refusal to
[Vol. 3
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/5
SUPERVISORY POWER
These same thoughts were echoed by the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in In re MacNeil Brothers Co." in its statement that juris-
diction of the court of appeals was purely statutory and that it had no
general supervisory power over district court judges.47 In MacNeil, a
federal district court had dismissed a petition for removal but had not
remanded the case to the state court. A petition for a writ of mandamus
directing the district court judge to proceed to a disposition of the case
followed in which petitioners alleged that jurisdiction of the court of
appeals in the matter arose from its general supervisory powers over
district court judges. In disclaiming any power to supervise district
court judges, the court indicated it did not believe that the All Writs
Act gave it the power to supervise the administration of justice in federal
courts within its circuit, 9 nor did the Act bestow upon the court the
authority to review by writ of mandamus an otherwise nonappealable
order simply because it believed that immediate review was in the best
interests of justice. 0
Where these courts of appeals were either unable or unwilling to find
a supervisory power, the Supreme Court in a 1957 case, La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co.,5 was not. The case involved the action of a district judge
in ordering, pursuant to Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 5 the referral of two separate antitrust cases to trial before a mas-
exercise jurisdiction except where provided by the Congress is an expression of adherence
to the basic premise discussed previously that the inferior courts of limited jurisdiction
derive all their power from the Congress. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
46. 259 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
47. See id. at 387.
48. See id. The district court had dismissed the petition for removal citing, inter alia,
lack of jurisdiction. In the petition for the writ of mandamus, petitioner argued that
because removal was automatically accomplished as soon as a petition for removal was
filed, the district court had only two choices: decide the case, or remand it to state court.
Petitioners contended that failure of the district court to remand the case left it with only
one alternative: the court must proceed to a disposition of the case. See id. at 388.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 387. The court of appeals viewed the petition for the writ as an attempt
to obtain jurisdiction where it would otherwise not exist. The court reasoned that if the
district court had entered an order expressly remanding the case to state court, that order
would be a final decision which is normally appealable. Any jurisdiction the appellate
court might have to review such an order, however, is expressly prohibited by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) (1970), which provides that an order remanding to state court is not reviewable
by appeal or otherwise. Therefore, whether an order to remand was proper or not, no
jurisdiction existed to review either on appeal or by resort to the All Writs Act. See 259
F.2d at 388.
51. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
52. Rule 53(b) presently provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be
tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated;
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult
computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that
19771
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ter."' When the court of appeals issued writs of mandamus compelling
the judge to vacate his orders, petition to the Supreme Court followed.
The district judge argued that the court of appeals had no power to issue
the writs to review his interlocutory orders except where review of the
case on appeal after final judgment would be frustrated." In rejecting
this argument, the Court indicated that because the court of appeals
could entertain appeals at some stage of the proceedings, it had the
power under proper circumstances to issue writs of mandamus. 5 The
Court then reviewed the circumstances leading to the issuance of the
writs and found the court of appeals had acted properly.5 1 In so holding,
the Court accepted the finding of the court of appeals that the action of
the district court judge in referring the cases to a master was an abuse
of power under Rule 53(b) which amounted to nothing less than an
abdication of a judicial function which deprived the parties of the right
to trial before the court. This abuse of power, stated the Court, was
sufficient to warrant use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. 7
Not until the final paragraph of its decision did the Court breathe life
into the supervisory control doctrine: "We believe that supervisory con-
trol of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper
some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). At the time La Buy was handed down, the rule was identical to the
above exclusive of the phrase "and of difficult computation of damages." See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 53(b), 308 U.S. 728 (1939).
53. 352 U.S. at 250.
54. See id. at 254.
55. See id. at 255. The use of mandamus assumes the existence of two factors: (1)
appropriate jurisdiction in the court issuing the writ, and (2) some circumstance rendering
its exercise proper. Historically, appellate jurisdiction has been examined only within the
narrow confines of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, 1294 (1970). See notes 36-38 supra and accom-
panying text. The Court in La Buy, however, seemed to expand upon this grant. There,
appellate jurisdiction was viewed as existing in degrees and as flowing concurrently with
district court jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction exists as long as the appellate court
remains free to entertain appeals at some stage. The Court, in essence, found that the All
Writs Act conferred an independent source of appellate power upon courts of appeals. See
352 U.S. at 260-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of this premise, see
notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text.
56. See 352 U.S. at 251. The factors the Court examined included the district judge's
intimate knowledge of the matter owing to his handling of a variety of matters related to
the case, as well as his long experience in the antitrust field, the protracted length of the
case and concomitant difficulty in acquainting a master with the controversy, and the
needless delay that would be occasioned by use of a master who could devote no more than
part time to the case. See id. at 255-56, 259.
57. See id. at 256. The Court concluded that .'"wihere the subject concerns the en-
forcement of the . .. [riules which by law it is the duty of this Court to formulate and
put in force,' mandamus should issue to prevent such action thereunder so palpably
improper as to place it beyond the scope of the rule invoked." See id. at 256 (quoting Los
Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 706 (1927)).
[Vol. 3
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judicial administration in the federal system. ' 5 The Court provided no
authority for this statement. One interpretation of the basis for the
statement in which the Supreme Court created the supervisory power
doctrine is apparent; the Supreme Court simply reasoned that courts of
appeals require such a power and the power, therefore, must exist.
The language used in La Buy is similar to an earlier statement in
McNabb v. United States59 in which the Court made reference to "the
exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts."60 McNabb dealt with the admissibility of
incriminating statements made by the defendants after substantial pe-
riods of detention and before they had been taken before a United States
commissioner or judicial officer as required by law.' In reversing their
convictions which were based upon the use of this evidence, the Court
rejected the government's contention that the statements were admissi-
ble because the Constitution proscribes only "involuntary" confessions
and that the confessions, judged by appropriate criteria of
"voluntariness," had been freely given.6" The Court stated the Constitu-
tion was not the only source governing the admissibility of evidence in
federal criminal trials. From the very beginning of its history, the Court
itself had formulated rules of evidence as an exercise of its supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts. 3 This authority to establish and maintain standards of proce-
dure and evidence was found to exist implicitly within the Court's role
as judicial supervisor of the administration of criminal justice in federal
courts.6'
There are, however, important differences between the type of super-
58. 352 U.S. at 259-60.
59. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The rule in McNabb, which held as inadmissible incriminating
statements made by the defendants after lengthy detention, was overruled by Congress
in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). See
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112, 2126.
60. See 318 U.S. at 341.
61. See id. at 334-35. The Court set out a detailed history of federal and state legislation
providing that a person arrested be taken to a judicial officer having jurisdiction under
existing law. See id. at 342 & n.7. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person with-
out unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the
event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local
judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
See FED. R. CaM. P. 5 (1975).
62. See 318 U.S. at 339.
63. See id. at 341; accord, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946)
(selection of jury panels).
64. See 318 U.S. at 340.
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visory power exercised in McNabb and the type the La Buy Court estab-
lished. In McNabb, the Court discussed its role as a supervisory author-
ity over the administration of criminal justice. That is, it examined its
role as an appellate court of review in federal criminal cases and it
defined the scope of its review powers with respect to that type of litiga-
tion. The Court concluded that implicit in its power to review was the
ability to establish and maintain standards relating to procedures for
the conduct of trials in the federal courts. 5 The Court noted that al-
though it did not have the authority to dictate to state courts the man-
ner in which they should proceed, except to ensure "fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice," its role as the ultimate court of review in
the federal system permitted far greater latitude, and created a much
greater duty, to supervise the activities of the inferior federal courts. 6
In La Buy different considerations were operative. There the Court
indicated that the courts of appeals, by virtue of their existence as
appellate courts, required supervisory control over district court litiga-
tion to ensure proper administration of that jurisdiction." La Buy, then,
created a supervisory power to effectuate appellate jurisdiction in courts
of appeals, while McNabb merely implied that as an appellate authority
the Supreme Court functioned as a supervisor. Further, McNabb dealt
with the exercise of a supervisory authority by the Court to formulate
rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions." This
supervisory control was in the nature of establishing court procedures
and obviously not designed to extend or enhance the constitutional
grant of authority with which the Court was already vested. La Buy, on
the other hand, appears to elevate the All Writs Act to a grant of juris-
diction exercisable by courts of appeals independent of the express juris-
diction provided in Sections 1291 through 1294 of Title 28, incident to
its supervisory power over district court litigation. 9 Apparently, what
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1956).
68. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 55 supra. Mr. Justice Brennan reached this very conclusion in his dissent
in La Buy. He argued that finality had always been the cornerstone of appellate review.
The effect of this decision was to "invade a domain reserved by the Constitution exclu-
sively to the Congress." See 352 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The question in
Mr. Justice Brennan's view was not whether Judge La Buy's order was reviewable by the
court of appeals but rather whether review must await final decision or was appropriate
by way of petition under the All Writs Act. See id. at 260. He vigorously dissented,
concluding that the majority position removed the long-established requirement of finality
and vested the appellate courts with an additional source of power:
What this Court is saying, therefore, is that the All Writs Act confers an inde-
pendent appellate power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders.
I have always understood the law to be precisely to the contrary. The power
granted by the Courts of Appeals by the All Writs Act is not an appellate power
[Vol. 3
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the Court in La Buy has granted to the courts of appeals is the power
to intercede in district court litigation at times and for purposes other
than those statutorily prescribed, whenever a court of appeals considers
such intercession necessary to "effectuate what seems to [it] to be the
manifest ends of justice." 0
Irrespective of the lack of precedent for the establishment of the su-
pervisory power doctrine, the doctrine, since La Buy, has been reaf-
firmed by every court of appeals that has confronted the issue.7' As
recently as 1974, in Ehrlichman v. Sirica,7 Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
sitting as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a peti-
tion seeking a stay of a district judge's order, reasserted the existence
of the doctrine. 71 What the Chief Justice found to exist within the powers
of a court of appeals was a limited power, exercisable either by way of
mandamus or in its supervisory function over the trial courts, to review
matters that are essentially within the sound judicial discretion of the
trial judge." In this particular case, both the prosecution and defense
had requested an extension of the trial date, and the district court
refused. The defendant then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the
court of appeals to delay the trial. The court of appeals, rather than
ruling directly on the petition, remanded the case with a recommenda-
but merely an auxiliary power in aid of and to protect the appellate jurisdiction
conferred by other provisions of law, e.g., the power to review final decisions
granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to review specified exceptional classes of
interlocutory orders granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1292. This holding that an indepen-
dent appellate power is given by the All Writs Act not only discards the con-
straints upon the scope of the power to issue extraordinary writs . . . but, by
the very fact of doing so, opens wide the crack in the door which, since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, has shut out from intermediate appellate review all inter-
locutory actions of the District Courts not within the few exceptional classes now
specified by the Congress in § 1292.
See id. at 263.
70. See United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959) (per curiam). In Ritter,
the United States had petitioned the trial court for an amended judgment and trial of the
remaining issues before another judge. The trial court denied the motion even though the
Tenth Circuit had "suggested" the case be heard before another judge. On appeal, the
appellate court, citing La Buy, stated that it had the power and the inescapable duty to
grant the relief sought whether exercised under the All Writs Act or as an adjunct to its
appellate supervisory control of the district courts. The court, therefore, ordered that
further proceedings in the case be heard before a judge to be designated by the chief judge
of the circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1970). See id. That section provides that
"[t]he chief judge of a circuit may, in the public interest, designate and assign temporar-
ily any district judge of the circuit to hold a district court in any district within the
circuit." See 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1970).
71. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing an exhaus-
tive list of cases).
72. 419 U.S. 1310 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1974).
73. See id. at 1311.
74. See id.
19771
13
et al.: Recusal of Federal District Court Judges and the "Supervisory Pow
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tion that the district judge consider a three- or four-week delay."5 The
Chief Justice, finding no fault with this exercise of authority by the
court of appeals, characterized it as a "de facto supervisory function"7
of the court. A further affirmation of the existence of this supervisory
power is implicit in his statement that "[ain individual Circuit Justice
does not possess the supervisory powers of a court of appeals concerning
the activities of the district courts within its circuit."'77
Although acceptance of this doctrine is now widespread, the cases
that have discussed it have not clearly defined either its scope or origin.
The La Buy Court indicated that the supervisory power is to be used as
"necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system."78
This broad construction implicitly gives courts of appeals wide latitude
to exercise the power. However, in Ehrlichman, the Court described the
power as "limited,"7 9 implying that there are restrictions on its use. In
either case, application of the doctrine is undoubtedly limited by the
jurisdictional grant of power conferred by Congress because a power,
impliedly conferred, is valid only as a means to the end of effectuating
the express power. 0 Thus it can never extend beyond the express grant
of power from which it springs, and thereby create a new and broader
power.
Federal court jurisdiction, therefore, is susceptible to judicial altera-
tion. In the past, the courts, unwilling to extend congressionally con-
ferred powers, followed a rule of judicial restraint. Thus, support for the
75. See id. at 1310-11. The defendant sought to delay the start of the trial because of
past and continuing pretrial publicity and insufficient time to prepare his defense. The
prosecution joined in this application to defer the commencement of trial also citing lack
of time for preparation. See id. at 1310.
76. See id. at 1311. The court of appeals had denied mandamus relief, yet remanded
and recommended the district judge consider a three- or four-week delay. Chief Justice
Burger saw his function as a circuit justice in the matter as limited. The pretrial order
issued by the trial court was essentially a matter within the sound judicial discretion of
that court. Once the order is issued, courts of appeals must be looked to as the primary
source of relief because they would be in closer touch with the activities of the district
courts within that circuit. Even then, the power of a court of appeals to intervene is limited
to use of mandamus or as incident to its supervisory function over the trial court. Nothing
more than coincidence placed Chief Justice Burger in the same geographical setting as
the trial thus permitting him to observe the publicity attendant to this particular trial.
This similarity of location was not sufficient to permit intervention where not otherwise
appropriate. See id. at 1311-12.
77. Id. at 1312.
78. See 352 U.S. at 259-60.
79. See 419 U.S. at 1311 (1974).
80. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421, 4 Wheat. 159, 206 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.) (regarding congressional exercise of implied power: "Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.").
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existence of a supervisory power in courts of appeals over district court
litigation is of recent vintage. Likewise, the scope of the doctrine re-
mains unsettled. In Reserve, the appellate court, cognizant of its
"inherent supervisory power," and citing the need to protect its previous
mandate, exercised that power sua sponte. By its action, the Reserve
court went one step beyond what any appellate court had attempted
previously and, therefore, more deeply rooted the concept of inherent
supervisory authority in the federal judicial system.
III. POWER TO REMOVE A FEDERAL JUDGE
The remaining questions posed by the Reserve decision are whether
the doctrine of inherent supervisory power encompasses removal of a
district court judge by a court of appeals and whether the court may
exercise the power sua sponte. Prior to consideration of these questions,
two concepts require perusal: (1) the existence of authority, generally,
to remove federal judges; and (2) whether a court of appeals is ever
authorized to remove a district judge. An understanding of the policies
underlying removal of a judge from office will assist in the examination
of removal of a judge from a particular case.
A. Removal in General
The Constitution provides that federal judges shall hold office during
good behavor.8 s In property terms, a judge may be said to have a life
estate in office subject to defeasance only by breach of a condition
subsequent." Impeachment is the only expressed method that the Con-
stitution provides to defeat this life tenure" and, therefore, is often
considered the exclusive method of removal.8 ' Recently the exclusivity
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office." Id.
82. See Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475, 1478 (1970).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id.
84. See Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from
History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 passim (1969). The argument most frequently advanced
in support of this conclusion is that Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution expressly
provides that the means of removal of all civil officers of the United States is impeach-
ment, and that the existence of this provision impliedly bars all alternative methods. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 498 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961); Note, The Exclusive-
ness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1937). See
generally Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American
Precedents, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 135.
Hamilton argued that the Constitution provided only one method, impeachment, to
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of this method, however, has been the subject of dispute. One commen-
tator has advanced a strong argument supporting the existence of both
a judicial and legislative alternative to impeachment.1
5
Irrespective of whether one or more methods exist to accomplish re-
moval, the concerns remain the same: a balance must be struck between
the need for an independent judiciary and the necessity of removing
from office one who has violated the "good behavior" mandate."8 The
framers of the Constitution, recognizing the need for an independent
judiciary, restricted the means of removing judges and provided that the
removal process be slow and cumbersome. 7 Their concern, as Alexander
Hamilton indicated, was to avoid control of the judiciary by other
remove a judge and that such a provision was consistent with the concept that the judici-
ary must be independent to function effectively:
The precautions for this responsibility are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. They [judges] are liable to be impeached for malconduct by
the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may
be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only
provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of
the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution
in respect to our own judges.
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra at 498. He did believe, however, that "without any formal
or express provision, [insanity of a judge] may be safely pronounced to be a virtual
disqualification." See id. at 498-99. Hamilton stressed that the necessary independence
could be assured only by providing for life tenure and by removing from the legislative
branch the ability to lower the salary of judicial officers. See id. See generally note 88
infra.
85. See Berger, supra note 82. Berger's argument focuses upon the existence, at the time
the Constitution was adopted, of a judicial power to declare a forfeiture upon breach of a
condition subsequent, and, upon the premise that a dispute over whether the condition
was breached constitutes a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article I, and,
therefore, falls within the "judicial power." Thus, he concluded, Congress could adopt
legislation establishing a special court to adjudicate disputes over whether the "good
behavior" condition was breached. Such legislation would do no more than grant to the
court subject matter jurisdiction over a matter that was within the constitutional grant
of power to the judiciary but previously outside its subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at
1484-86. Even assuming that forfeiture of judicial office was not available at common law,
action by Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause would be appropriate to
provide a new remedy for forfeiture of office pursuant to the existence of an implied
judicial power to remove a judge for misbehavior. See id. at 1529. Berger concluded that
nothing less than an express prohibition in the Constitution against the use of any method
but impeachment should preclude resort to the implied powers concept. See id. Para-
phrasing language used by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 4 Wheat. 159 (1819), Berger would place the burden of supporting the exclusivity
concept upon "[tihose who would deny to Congress the right to select the means for the
termination which is implicit in the Constitutional text." See Berger, supra note 82, at
1529-30. See generally Note, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment,
20 VAND. L. REV. 723 (1967).
86. See generally THE: FEDERALIST No. 79, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961);
Berger, supra note 82.
87. See Ziskind, supra note 84, at 152-53.
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branches of the government.8 His words provide a cogent reminder of
the judicial interest: "The complete independence of the courts of jus-
tice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." 9 Therefore, to
prevent the possibility of control by either of the coordinate branches
of the government, judges had to be assured the utmost independence.90
The concern for an independent judiciary, as evidenced by the protec-
tion afforded against removal from office, provides an instructive back-
ground for examination of the question: What methods are available to
remove a federal judge from a particular case? Similar interests are at
stake in the removal of a judge from a particular case as were discussed
regarding removal from office. The framers of the Constitution were
concerned with insulating and assuring the independence of the judici-
ary from undue influence of the legislative and executive branches of
government.' Here the focus is the independence of one level of the
judiciary from interference of another level. The interest in the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, however, is equally important regarding in-
trajudicial interference.2
Of course, the competing interest is the preservation of the rights of
litigants against the prejudicial effects created by judicial abuse. 3 The
88. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must per-
ceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to
the political rights of the Constitution....
... [Because of] the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co6rdinate branches;
and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence
as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the
citadel of the public justice and the public security.
Id. at 490-91.
89. See id. at 491.
90. See id. at 490-91. In order to assure this independence, suggestions that the Consti-
tution include a provision for removal based on the inability of judges to perform was
rejected. If in existence, Hamilton indicated, the provision would either go unused or
would be more likely to be abused than properly exercised: "An attempt to fix the bound-
ary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal
and party attachments and enmities than advance the interest of justice or the public
good." See id. No. 79, at 498.
91. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 382 U.S.
1003, 1006 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J.
Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
92. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 382 U.S.
1003, 1005-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) ("We should stop in its infancy, before it has
any growth at all, this idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable
for their efficiency or lack of it to the judges just over them in the federal judicial sys-
tem.").
93. See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
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legal profession, the judiciary, and the Congress developed ethical stan-
dards to prevent judicial abuse from interfering with the rights of liti-
gants. 4 The response of the legal profession was a Code of Judicial
Conduct designed to guide and assist members of the judiciary in their
conduct while in office. 5 This standard was used subsequently by the
Judicial Conference of the United States" as the model for its ethical
standard regarding all federal judges. 7 Both the legal and judicial stan-
dards possess one major weakness: they are merely advisory. There are
no enforcement powers or disciplinary procedures to support them." In
contrast, four enforceable statutory provisions exist regarding disqualifi-
cation of federal judges from a particular case."
§§ 1789, 1944-46 (4th ed. 1873).
94. See notes 95-99 infra and accompanying text.
95. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). See generally Sutton, A Comparison of
the Code of Professional Responsibility with the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L.
REV. 355, 355. The predecessor to the Code, termed the "Canons of Judicial Ethics," had
its origin some 50 years prior to promulgation of the present Code. In effect, the new Code
is a revision of the original Canons designed to reflect current needs and meet current
problems. See Preface to ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The Judicial Conference is required to survey matters
constituting the "business of the court," and study the operation and effect of general
rules of practice and procedure in use in the courts. See id.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6351, 6353; Comment, The Elusive Appearance of Propriety: Judicial Dis-
qualification Under Section 455, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 104, 104-05 (1975). See generally
Ainsworth, Impact of the Code of Judicial Conduct on Federal Judges, 1972 UTAH L. REv.
369.
98. See Comment, The Elusive Appearance of Propriety: Judicial Disqualification
Under Section 455, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 104, 126-28 (1975). See generally Martineau,
Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410.
99. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, 292, 455 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). These provisions are
enforceable by means of 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). In fact, one of these four was amended
as a result of the prior approval by the American Bar Association and adoption by the
Judicial Conference of a similar standard for disqualification of judges. See H.R. REP. No.
1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6353
(indicating impact of action by ABA and Judicial Conference upon Congress; general
history of the amendment to Section 455). That standard in pertinent part provides:
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartial-
ity might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or per-
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has
been a material witness concerning it;
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse
or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
[Vol. 3
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All four of the statutory methods of disqualification are found in Title
28 of the United States Code. Two of the provisions, Section 47100 and
Section 292(b)"'0 have only a tangential relationship to this Note, and
will, therefore, be dealt with summarily. Section 47 provides that trial
judges are automatically disqualified from hearing an appeal from deci-
sions or issues previously tried before them. 02 Section 292(b) permits the
chief judge of a circuit to temporarily assign any district judge to hold
a district court in any district within the circuit."3
The remaining two statutory provisions, Section 144104 and Section
455,105 are more pertinent. Both are designed for situations where bias
or prejudice of a federal judge is alleged and disqualification is sought.0 0
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1). See generally Frank, Commentary on
Disqualification of Judges-Canon 3C, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 377.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
101. Id. § 292(b).
102. See id. § 47.
103. See id. § 292(b). Section 292(b) provides that "[tihe chief judge of a circuit may,
in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily any district judge of the circuit
to hold a district court in any district within the circuit." See id. Temporary assignment
appears to apply only to situations where one district has a peculiar need for judges not
presently available. Although the language suggests that Section 292(b) pertains only to
assignment where a need exists, at least one court used this section in conjunction with
the removal of a district judge from a case over which he had been presiding. See United
States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959) (per curiam). The case had been before
the court previously on another issue at which time the court, noting the "minimum of
judicial impartiality" present, suggested future proceedings be held before another judge.
See id. at 31. Judge Ritter did not follow the court's suggestion and denied a motion for a
trial before another judge. The Tenth Circuit, citing the All Writs Act and its inherent
powers of appellate jurisdiction, ordered the chief judge of the circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 292(b) (1970) to reassign the case. See id. at 32.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
105. Id. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
106. See id. §§ 144, 455 (1970 & Supp. V 1970). Both sections serve the same basic
purpose. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976). That function is to disqualify those judges whose
impartiality might be questioned owing, inter alia, to the existence of a personal prejudice
against the litigants. See id.
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Section 144 is the more limited of the two. It provides for self-
disqualification of a district judge whenever any party to the proceeding
files a timely affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice. 7 Subdivision
b of Section 455 also requires self-disqualification where bias or preju-
dice exists,'08 but goes beyond Section 144. Section 455 expands the
types of situations where disqualification is required to include: (1) prior
representation with respect to the matter in controversy; (2) prior gov-
ernmental employment which resulted in participation in the matter in
controversy; (3) financial interest individually, as a fiduciary, or of a
spouse or minor child; and (4) familial relation with a party or counsel. 19
In addition to the difference in scope, Section 455 is significant be-
cause it applies to the disqualification of justices, magistrates, and refer-
ees in bankruptcy, as well as judges.I" Thus application of Section 455
is not restricted to district judges, as is Section 144.' Section 455 also
differs procedurally; it does not require an affidavit to be filed. If the
impartiality of the judge may reasonably be questioned, or if any of the
circumstances enumerated within the statute exist, the judge should
disqualify himself or herself."2
To summarize, both Section 144 and Section 455 seek to ensure that
the federal courts are free not only from bias or prejudice, but also from
the appearance of bias or prejudice.' And, while they differ somewhat
in their scope of operation and application, they share a common thread
in that they are designed to be self-enforcing."' As was indicated, the
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970); Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702 (1942); Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777, 788 (10th Cir. 1941) (if
affidavit and certificate of counsel meet statutory requirements, presiding judge stands
recused); Johnson v. United States, 35 F.2d 355, 357 (W.D. Wash. 1929). There are six
essential features of Section 144. It (1) applies only to district judges, (2) requires some
personal bias or prejudice, (3) requires an affidavit stating the facts and reasons for the
belief be filed, (4) is effective only when filed at least ten days prior to trial, (5) permits
only one such affidavit per case, and (6) requires a certificate of counsel of record. See 28
U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
109. See id. § 455(b)(2)-(5).
110. See id. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975).
111. Compare id. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975) with id. § 144 (1970).
112. See id. § 455(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975). While the language of Section 144 contem-
plates the filing of an affidavit, a judge may act sua sponte to remove himself or herself.
See United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 92 (D.N.J. 1954).
113. Compare Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 444 F.2d 1344, 1348 (2d Cir. 1971)
(purpose of Section 144 is to avoid appearance as well as actual existence of bias or
prejudice) with Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (same regarding Section 455).
114. The sections are self-enforcing in the sense that the judge, under the language of
the two provisions, should disqualify himself or herself if bias or prejudice exists. Section
144 states the "judge shall proceed no further." See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). Section 455
requires the judge "shall disqualify himself," See id. § 455(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975).
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issue of bias under Section 144 generally is raised by affidavit of one of
the litigants, accompanied by a certificate of counsel attesting to the
fact that the affidavit is filed in good faith."5 Alternatively, the issue
may be raised by the presiding judge, sua sponte."8 In comparison,
Section 455 contemplates several methods of raising the issue: (1) by the
judge, sua sponte;"17 (2) by a party by motion in the trial court;"' (3)
through assignment of error on appeal;"' (4) by interlocutory appeal;'20
and (5) by mandamus.'2'
The court in Reserve, however, did not use Section 144 nor did it rely
upon Section 455 to support its action. In fact, neither was available for
use by the court. Section 144 is only available where an affidavit is filed
before trial,'22 and Section 455 was not available due to the date of its
enactment coupled with the express qualification that it only be applied
prospectively. 123 In addition, Section 455 apparently is not applicable to
situations where the alleged bias relates merely to bias obtained while
hearing evidence in a case.2 4 Moreover, the issue was not raised for the
appellate court's consideration by any of the methods previously
listed.' 5 Therefore, examination of the action taken by the Eighth Cir-
115. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975).
118. See, e.g., Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1965).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1974); Shadid v.
Oklahoma City, 494 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
120. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
121. See Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
123. Section 455, as amended, was adopted on December 5, 1974 and contained lan-
guage indicating that it would not apply to any proceeding commenced prior to the date
of adoption. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 3, 88 Stat. 1610. The Reserve
litigation had commenced on February 2, 1972. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). The prior version of Section 455 was also inapplicable. It required
removal only if the judge had a substantial interest in the case, had been of counsel, was
a material witness, or was so related to or connected with any party or his or her attorney
as to render it improper for the judge to hear the matter. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908.
124. Section 455 was amended to conform to Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and disqualify judges for bias, prejudice, or conflicts of interest. See H.R. REP. No. 1453,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351, 6351. The
Section covers situations of personal bias or prejudice or knowledge of disputed facts, of
previous involvement in the case either as a lawyer or as a witness, of financial interest,
and of blood relationship to a party. It does not require disqualification where a judge
expresses an opinion on a legal matter in the case, Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh,
395 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (W.D. Pa. 1975), or where a judge entertains an attitude toward
the subject matter of the case, Lawton v. Taff, 327 F. Supp. 670, 673 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
See generally note 163 infra.
125. Reserve did not seek to recuse Judge Lord until presentation of its oral argument
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cuit in Reserve leads to the conclusion that the court, in effect, created
an additional method by which the issue of bias or prejudice might be
raised. This new method, unlike the others, does not require action by
either the litigants or the trial judge to raise the issue. If Reserve is
followed, a court of appeals, acting sua sponte, may order the disqualifi-
cation of a trial judge based upon its inherent supervisory control over
the litigation.
B. Removal of Federal Judges by Courts of Appeals
The use of mandamus is an accepted method of raising the issue of
bias or prejudice before a court of appeals. Indeed, eight of the eleven
circuits accept mandamus as an appropriate means to force removal of
district judges. '26 However, each of those circuits, in exercising this au-
thority, has done so only after the district judge had refused to disqual-
ify himself or herself. "7
Apart from mandamus and the appeals process of citing the trial
judge's conduct as prejudicial error,'28 one circuit has found an addi-
tional source of authority, similar to that exercised in Reserve, to justify
removal. In Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler,'29 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit stated that upon refusal of a district judge to disqualify
himself or herself it had the power and inescapable duty either under
the All Writs Act'" or under its inherent powers of appellate jurisdiction
to take action to guarantee a fair and impartial trial.''
In Chandler, Texaco sought to prevent the Honorable Stephan Chan-
dler, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, from proceeding further in an action pending in
his court. Defendant Texaco alleged in its petition that one of the attor-
neys representing the plaintiffs in the district court action had previ-
ously defended Judge Chandler in a $10,000,000 action brought against
to the court of appeals. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir. 1976).
Because neither Reserve's petition for mandamus nor its appeal from the imposition of
the $100,000 penalty specifically sought the removal of Judge Lord, the appellate court
refused to base its decision to remove on Reserve's action. See id. at 188-89.
126. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United
Family Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Wolfson v. Palmieri,
396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F.2d
87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th
Cir. 1955); Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (per curiam); Henry v. Speer, 201
F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913).
127. See note 126 supra.
128. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
129. 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
131. See 354 F.2d at 657.
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the judge for alleged malicious prosecution, libel, and slander.' 2 Tex-
aco asserted that the prior relationship between Judge Chandler and
the attorney mandated disqualification under Section 4 5 5 . 13 The judge,
although repeatedly stating that he would not try the case, refused to
disqualify himself.' 34 The appellate court agreed with Texaco that Sec-
tion 455 required disqualification and ordered the removal of Judge
Chandler. The court indicated that its inherent powers of appellate
jurisdiction were to be exercised whenever necessary "to effectuate what
seems to us to be the manifest ends of justice."'' 5 In Chandler, however,
as in other cases where courts of appeals resorted to mandamus to effect
removal, the court exercised its power only after disqualification had
been sought and refused in the trial court. That is, no court before
Reserve assumed the power to remove sua sponte.
C. Removal Sua Sponte
Assuming the court in Reserve could have removed Judge Lord had a
proper petition for mandamus been filed, does the court's action of
removal sua sponte, based on an extension of the supervisory power
doctrine, differ only in a procedural sense? That is, if a court of appeals
has the power to remove a district judge, does it matter how that court
exercises its power?
Examination of the original questions posed by this Note, relating to
the power and authority of courts of appeals, has established two points.
First, courts of appeals do have an inherent supervisory power over
district court litigation.'36 Second, courts of appeals do have authority
to remove district judges from particular cases.'37 Both the power to
supervise and the authority to remove, however, have limitations. Thus,
the pivotal question is whether the inherent supervisory power of courts
of appeals is broad enough to support the removal of a district judge.
The Eighth Circuit in Reserve answered affirmatively and thereby cre-
ated a new method to achieve removal - removal sua sponte.
The action taken by the court in Reserve was not a traditional use of
an appellate court's power to act sua sponte. Clearly, federal courts of
132. See id. at 656.
133. This action was brought prior to the 1974 amendment to Section 455 and, thus,
was based upon its predecessor. It provided for disqualification where the judge is "so
related to or connected with any party or his attorney." See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975)); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350
F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1965) (prior version of Section 455 required disqualification of
district judge where attorneys for one of the parties represented the judge previously).
134. See 354 F.2d at 656.
135. See id. at 657 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959)
(per curiam)).
136. See text accompanying notes 35-66 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 126-35 supra.
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appeals do have a limited inherent authority to so act.' 3 However, the
exercise of this authority primarily occurs when the court is considering
the question of jurisdiction. An appellate court must satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction and that the lower court whose decision is under
review had jurisdiction.'39 Therefore, if the question of jurisdiction is not
brought before the court by the litigants, the court must, of its own
motion, raise the issue, because appellate jurisdiction is both prescribed
and limited by statute."' In addition to sua sponte consideration of
jurisdictional matters, appellate courts have invoked this authority to
support a recall of a previously issued mandate.'' In fact, the court in
Reserve originally exercised this latter type of sua sponte action.' It
opened its prior mandate and directed the Army Corps of Engineers to
supervise the filtration of the drinking water of certain communities on
the North Shore of Lake Superior.' But the court went beyond ordering
recall sua sponte; it then ordered, sua sponte, removal of the trial
judge.' This action was unique and necessitates examination of two
points.
The initial focus should be upon whether the court in Reserve had the
power to remove sua sponte. Of course, no express power exists to sup-
port the action,"' nor does it appear that the court inherently had this
power.'" To recognize that courts of appeals have an inherent supervi-
sory control over district court litigation is one matter. To imply, how-
ever, that this supervisory power includes removal sua sponte where the
appellate court is of the opinion that the judge's bias will interfere with
a just adjudication of the controversy is quite another consideration.
First of all, bias, without evidence that it was extrajudicial, has never
138. See Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAm L. REv.
477 (1958-59). For a definition of sua sponte, see note 1 supra.
139. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
140. See Tye v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 173 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1949).
141. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Perhaps more appropriately, this power to recall should be considered as an exception to
the general rule that a mandate once issued cannot be recalled. Issuance of a mandate
signals an end to the litigation and recall is appropriate only upon a showing of good cause
and where necessary to prevent injustice. See id. For a discussion of raising jurisdictional
and other matters sua sponte, see Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review,
27 FORDHAM L. REv. 477, 499-508 (1958-59).
142. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 183, 188 (8th Cir. 1976).
143. See id. at 183.
144. See id. at 188.
145. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. The government can exercise only those
powers granted to it by the people. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405, 4 Wheat.
159, 199 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). From this it follows that the implied powers are limited
by those expressly conferred and that only those powers consistent with the express grant
can be implied.
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been held sufficient to justify removal.' 7 A judge whose bias stems from
his or her participation in a case cannot be removed on that basis
alone.' 9 Moreover, frustration over the inability to otherwise discipline
a judge should not form the basis for an action which otherwise is unwar-
ranted.
The second question thus becomes whether the power to remove sua
sponte, as an extension of the supervisory power doctrine, should exist.
The policy considerations are well-delineated. Strong arguments exist
in support and in condemnation of the power. On one hand, proponents
of the court's exercise of authority cite the right of all litigants to a fair
and impartial trial, the necessity to maintain the integrity of the federal
courts, and the lack of any available alternative means to ensure a just
adjudication on the merits. Opponents, however, argue with equal force
that judges need to be independent of control from other judges and
courts as well as from legislative or executive domination,'", that inher-
ent in the exercise of this power to remove is the potential for abuse, and
that other methods are adequate to assure the fair treatment of litigants.
Another consideration is whether there is a need for the power. Alter-
natives to removal sua sponte may suffice. For example, the Reserve
court had several options at its disposal. The court could have granted
Reserve's petition seeking to enjoin Judge Lord from interfering with the
state administrative hearings,' 51 thus quieting one complaint of the de-
fendant, namely judicial interference. Similarly, had the appellate court
found that the district court order requiring Reserve to deposit a
$100,000 check' 5' amounted to a denial of due process, it could have
reversed the order and returned the money to Reserve. Removal was not
required to accomplish either result. This course of action would have
ameliorated any harmful effects the alleged bias may have occasioned.
In addition, if the remaining issues in the case ultimately were decided
against Reserve, its remedy as to any error committed at trial by the
judge resulting from the alleged bias was by appeal.'52 Therefore, the
Reserve case itself demonstrates that alternative remedies may obviate
the need for a power to remove sua sponte.
An additional consideration as to whether the power should exist is
the availability of the amended version of Section 455.153 That section,
147. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
148. See id.
149. See notes 81-91 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 182 (8th Cir. 1976).
151. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
152. However, an argument can be made that an appeal seeking a new trial before
another judge was not a feasible remedy due to the length of the litigation and the
complexity of the issues involved in the case. The Eighth Circuit, perhaps, had this in
mind when it created the extraordinary remedy of removal sua sponte.
153. For a discussion regarding the nonapplicability of Section 455 to the Reserve case,
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unlike Section 144, does not limit the time period to petition for re-
moval.'54 Disqualification under the amended statute is based upon an
objective "reasonable man" standard.5 5 Actual bias need not be shown,
only that there exists "a reasonable factual basis for doubting the
judge's impartiality."'' 6 If the standard is met, and the judge still refuses
to disqualify himself or herself, a petition for mandamus alleging abuse
of sound judicial discretion may be presented and removal ordered.157 As
stated above, Section 455 was not available to Reserve'56 and the Eighth
Circuit thus resorted to the creation of an entirely new method to ac-
complish removal. Had the Reserve case arisen at a later time, and had
the alleged bias been determined to be extrajudicial, the court may not
have found it necessary to remove sua sponte. Thus the power exercised
may be merely a creature of timing. Because the amended version of
Section 455 is now available to effect removal, future exercise of removal
sua sponte as created by the Reserve court may be unnecessary.
Each of the considerations examined above points to the conclusion
that the supervisory power doctrine should not be extended to recognize
an inherently vested power in an appellate court to remove a trial judge
sua sponte. The need for an independent judiciary,' 59 the availability of
other remedies,'60 and the amended version of Section 455 which facili-
tates disqualification 6 ' provide ample rationales. Removal sua sponte is
much broader than the power to remove upon a petition for mandamus
because initiation of removal then rests with the appellate court rather
than a petitioner. This, combined with the potential for abuse, renders
the power to remove sua sponte more than a mere procedural variation.
D. Sanctions for Judicial Abuse - A Need to Balance the Interests
To conclude that removal sua sponte is an inappropriate extension of
appellate court jurisdiction, however, is not to deny the validity of the
statement, expressed by the Eighth Circuit in Reserve, that litigants
must be assured a fair and impartial trial free from any taint of judicial
abuse. 112 In addition, it may be argued that not even the advent of the
see note 123 supra and accompanying text.
154. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) with id. § 455(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
155. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6355; Comment, The Elusive Appearance of Propriety: Judicial
Disqualification Under Section 455, 25 DE PAuL L. REv. 104, 109 (1975).
157. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
158. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 155-60 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1975).
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amended version of Section 455 is sufficient to ensure impartiality."3
Thus, future litigation may present to an appellate court a situation
identical to the Reserve case. In Reserve, frustration over the inability
to otherwise control the activities of the trial judge lay at the heart of
the action taken by the appellate court."'
Within this frustration lies a possible solution to the problem. The
Reserve case underscores the need to develop a new sanction that can
be imposed upon a trial judge where a proper showing of abuse of judi-
cial authority, other than abuse stemming from extrajudicial bias, is
made. But the difficulty of the sanction imposed by the court in
Reserve, namely removal, is that it strokes too broadly. As a result, this
type of sanction itself is too easily subject to abuse.'65 Assuming that
existing sanctions are not adequate in all instances, any new measure
must balance the interests at stake. That is, in attempting to further
assure the rights of litigants to a fair and impartial trial, the sanction
imposed cannot undercut the need for a viable and independent trial
court free from interference of an appellate court in all matters other
than those within appellate court jurisdiction. If trial courts do not
maintain their independence, litigants will also find their rights im-
163. Had Section 455 been available, Reserve could have filed an affidavit of bias
against Judge Lord, and if he had refused to disqualify himself, Reserve could have
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel disqualification. Clearly a technical applica-
tion of Section 455, as amended, could have produced this result. However, an argument
can be made that the amended version of Section 455 would not have supported removal
given the particular facts in this case. That result follows if the Davis court's construction
of Section 144 and Section 455 as in pari materia is accepted. See Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976). The court
in Davis indicated that "an appellate court ... should determine the disqualifica-
tion .... on the basis of conduct extra-judicial in nature as distinguished from conduct
within a judicial context." See id. Reserve, by this standard, would have had to show that
the bias or prejudice, alleged was not a result of occurences at trial but rather existed apart
from the litigation and as a result of some occurence or event not connected to the
litigation. For a further discussion of the extrajudicial standard of bias or prejudice, see
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 580-83 (1966) and Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22 (1921).
164. The frustration of the appellate court with the actions of Judge Lord is nowhere
more apparent than in its statement that "[dlisregard of this court's mandate by a
lawyer would be contemptuous; it can hardly be excused when the reckless action ema-
nates from a judicial officer." See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 188 (8th Cir.
1976). Similarly, the frustration of Judge Lord, which perhaps prompted his actions, is
apparent in his statement, later quoted by the court of appeals, "that in every instance
Reserve Mining Company hid the evidence, misrepresented, delayed and frustrated the
ultimate conclusions." See id. at 185.
165. A foreseeable consequence of the use of this power will be the removal of activist
judges who involve themselves in the litigation and replacement with judges who would
play a more passive role. This result appears at odds with the general pattern of an
increasingly active federal district court judiciary anxious to ferret out the essential truths
in an ever more complex era of civil and criminal litigation.
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paired. Thus, if a sanction is to be developed, it must be so structured
as to be effective yet remain narrow enough to prevent the demise of the
independence of the trial court. Removal should never occur unless the
requisites of Section 144 or Section 455 are met, and in no instance
should it allow action sua sponte by the appellate court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit was convinced that interference by the trial judge was effectively
denying the defendant its fundamental right to a fair trial. Faced with
the prospect of continued judicial interference, the court of appeals
determined that removal of the trial judge was the only appropriate
action. Thus, the court, on its own motion, removed the trial judge.
Lacking a legal precedent, the court of appeals based its extraordinary
act on an extension of the "supervisory power" doctrine and, thereby,
created a new appellate power. At best, the Reserve court's action is an
anachronism because the facts of most cases will fall within the ambit
of the amended version of Section 455. At worst, the decision represents
the creation of a new appellate power which threatens the independence
of trial judges. Time alone will determine the ramifications of the six
words uttered by the appellate court in Reserve: "[W]e order corrective
measures sua sponte."
[Vol. 3
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/5
